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Spanish Accession to the EEC: A
Political Objective in an Economic
Reality
Vanessa Núñez Peñas
1 Relations  between Spain  and  the  European Economic  Community  (EEC)  had  a  long
history before the political  transition following November 1975.  The strict  isolation
after the defeat of fascism in 1945 was soon overcome. Spain signed treaties with the
USA  and  the  Papal  States  in  1953,  and  later  joined the  United  Nations  (1955),  the
International Monetary Fund (1958), the World Bank (1958) and the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (1959). When the transition began in Spain,
only  the  Council  of  Europe,  NATO  and  the  EEC  remained closed  to  the  Spanish
government. Bilateral relations were normalised for all countries with the exception of
Israel, Mexico and the communist regimes. An economic agreement was signed with
the EEC in 1970, and commercial  relations were completely regularised. However,  a
great  majority  of  Spaniards  saw  the  political  change  after  Franco’s  death  as  the
beginning of a new international project with crucial internal consequences.
2 The Fourth Congress of the European Movement, in Munich in June 1962, was a decisive
moment  for  Spanish  democrats.  There,  a  resolution  was  approved  demanding  a
democratic system in Spain before any accession or association with the EEC. Similarly
decisive was the subsequent action of the dictatorship against the participants1 after
the  up-to-then  diversified  opposition  came  together  and  contemplated  a  common
project for a future without Franco: accession to the EEC as a member with full rights.2
The repression was criticised at first by the member states and European institutions,
but  the  possibility  of  opening  the  Spanish  economy  to  the  European  Community
remained on the table until exploratory talks for a commercial agreement started in
1964.
3 A Preferential Trade Agreement was signed in 1970. No one saw it as a real change; its
basis was strictly limited to the area of economics. Politics were left aside, at least by
the European authorities  and the Francoist  regime.  However,  European institutions
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regularly condemned the lack of democracy and the violation of human rights in Spain,
though they never called into question the relationship between Spain and the EEC.
Only after the execution by firing squad of five leftists on 27 September 1975 did the
European Commission decide to  suspend negotiations for  the revision of  the Trade
Agreement. These revisions were requested after the first enlargement resulting from
the accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark in 1973. Even though the
member  states  withdrew  their  ambassadors  from  Madrid,  in  just  one  week  it  was
decided that normality should resume due to evidence of approaching political change
in view of the dictator’s weak health.3
4 The lack of consensus on actions against Franco’s dictatorship could be explained by a
diversity of interests and by the fact that political integration was not yet defined in
the  mid-1970s.  Furthermore,  the  European  project  was  restricted  to  the  economic
sphere. This paper discusses how an economic and technical entity could influence a
political process such as the Spanish transition to democracy, taking into consideration
the global consequences of this process.
 
The political influence of the accession negotiations
5 It would be easy to make the mistake of identifying the EEC of the 1970s or 1980s with
the more developed version of the 1990s. After the USSR was dissolved, the European
Union could more directly influence the transitional process,  as integration became
more political. Until then, the nature of the communitarian influence on international
relations was strictly conceptual. It was not a question of direct actions such as those of
the  member  states  and  their  foreign  policies,  but  of  concepts  like  Europe  or
Europeanization.4 This  meant  that  the  EEC  did  not  have  the  same  influence  as  a
national state; instead, it had François Duchêne’s notion of civilian power,  a focus on
non-military means, primarily economic, to secure national goals, and a willingness to
develop  supranational  structures  to  address  critical  issues  of  international
management.5
6 A  meeting  in  Madrid  on  25 November  1975,  after  the  coronation  of  Juan  Carlos  I,
between Edmund Wellenstein, director general of external relations in the European
Commission,  and  Alberto  Ullastres,  Spanish  ambassador  to  the  EEC,  serves  as  an
example of these methods. They discussed very general affairs, but by the end of the
evening  they  were  tackling  the  future  of  relations  in  light  of  the  change  in  the
leadership of the state.6 The commissioner emphasised the importance of amnesty for
political prisoners, and of caution in order to prevent a radicalization like the one that
occurred in Portugal.7 The development of real governmental change was seen as more
important  than  hastily  legalising  the  Communist  Party.  Such  suggestions  were
collected  months  later  in  a  report  signed  by  Maurice  Faure  and  presented  to  the
European Parliamentary Assembly. The report directly connected political change in
Spain with a redefinition of its relationship with the EEC.8
7 Submission of this report coincided with a trip by the minister of foreign affairs, José
María de Areilza, to the European capitals during the spring of 1976. The main goal of
this tour was to assess possible changes in the relationship with the Community and to
find out the minimum changes required before presenting the accession application.9 It
was  obvious  that  Franco’s  death  was  not  enough.  States  and  European institutions
insisted on reliable advances towards a democratic system, though it was harder to
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reach consensus on the speed of progress and international recognition. Even simply
scheduling the meetings with Areilza in each capital was reason for debate because
everybody knew that these meetings would determine future relations with the EEC
and NATO, and opinions about the political change differed among member states.10
8 This  meeting was the precursor to  further discussions about the European attitude
towards the Spanish transition. There was widespread belief that Spain would not be
able  to  accomplish  in  a  few  months  the  same  political  results  that  Portugal  had
achieved  in  almost  two  years.  Nor  was  the  EEC  more  demanding  with  the  new
government than with Franco’s regime before the September 1975 executions.11 The
Nine  rejected  any  possibility  of  considering  accession  for  the  moment,  though
resuming  positions  held  before  September  1975  would  not  pose  a  problem.  The
Commission was more cautious than the member states at this point, warning about
the  risk  of  creating  false  expectations  in  Spain.  The  main  problem  was  that  the
relationship, strictly economic and defined by the Preferential Trade Agreement, had
been  politicised  when  the  Commission  decided  to  suspend  negotiations  after  the
executions.
9 Over the next weeks there were many misunderstandings among European institutions.
The  member  states  were  concerned  because  a  political  complaint  could  have
embarrassing consequences for their economic relationship with Spain,12 and because
each  country  had  different  interests.  Britain  was  the  party  most  concerned  about
signing a new trade agreement with Spain as it would be the country most affected by
any  new  terms.  In  contrast,  Denmark  simply  wanted  to  declare  it  invalid,  the
governments  of  France  and  Italy  tried  to  avoid  any  change  that  involved
Mediterranean  agricultural  products,  and  the  main  objective  of  Germany  was  to
encourage  the  political  reform  program,  especially  following  the  appointment  of
Adolfo Suárez as prime minister in July 1976.13 However,  worst was the collision of
interests between the Commission and the Council, which directly affected relations
with Spain.
10 An enlightening incident with regard to this point was an official trip to Madrid in
December 1976 by a Commission delegation. Some of the ambassadors in the Spanish
capital  complained  about  the  excessive  secrecy  of  the  agenda,  saying  that  the
Commission could not assume responsibility for discussing politics with a state. The
competent authorities were the national governments, but the Commission said that it
was in charge of relations and economic negotiations with third parties.14 In an attempt
to  counteract  the  influence  that  national  embassies  wielded  over  the  Spanish
government, the Commission suggested the establishment of an official delegation with
semi-diplomatic  status  to  promote  effective  relations.15 Until  it  was  established,  in
December  1978,  the  meeting  point  was  the  Spanish  mission  to  the  European
Communities established in Brussels in 1965 –led first by Alberto Ullastres and then by
Raimundo Bassols in 1976.
11 There were regular meetings to share impressions and information about the strategies
to pursue. The Spanish mission recommended presenting the accession application as
soon as possible to take advantage of the proceedings already started by Greece and
Portugal.16 From  the  EEC’s  point  of  view,  the  main  worries  were  the  collapse  of
institutions and new competition within the European market.  Meanwhile from the
European Parliamentary Assembly there were some voices in favour of strengthening
the political responsibility of Europe with new democracies.17 However, the political
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influence  of  the  European  Community  as  a  supranational  organization  was  very
limited.18
12 The  principal  way  to  influence  the  Spanish  transition  was  to  inspire  a  new public
administration promoting particular legislation and governmental organisation. There
were many internal studies about the consequences of accession and the subsequent
Europeanization,19 all of them coordinated from an interdepartmental commission for
relations with the EEC.  This governmental  body was created just  a few weeks after
signing  the  Preferential  Trade  Agreement  in  order  to  coordinate  all  the  ministries
affected by the new situation after 1970. However, its new duty in December 1976 was
to get detailed information about European law in order to be able to adjust national
legislation and facilitate the future adoption and implementation of the acquis.20
13 Every branch of the state had to present a comprehensive report within two or three
months  considering  the  possibility  of  presenting  the  accession  application  before
summer  1977.  Thanks  to  these  preliminary  studies,  and  those  done  by  the
interdepartmental commission over the subsequent years, the Spanish government was
able  to  gradually  prepare  the  country  for  the  EEC  reality.  All  the  same,  when the
Commission staff visited Madrid in October 1977 to start working on Spain’s application
for membership, they did not find any authority clearly designated as responsible for
the  negotiations.21 They  understood  that  the  main  problems  were  the  difficult
economic situation, national political priorities and some significant differences within
the government regarding how to manage the negotiations team.
14 The  Commission  recommendation  was  to  designate  an  independent  body  from the
traditional ministries with a direct connection to the head of government and with full
authority over other ministries.22 At first, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was concerned
on  account  of  the  likelihood  of  losing  control  over  the  main  chapter  of  the  new
democratic  foreign  policy.  Finally,  given  the  magnitude  of  the  purpose,  Foreign
Minister Marcelino Oreja accepted the creation of  a separate Ministry for Relations
with  the  European  Communities  in  February  1978,  led  by  Leopoldo  Calvo-Sotelo
(1978-1980) and Eduardo Punset (1980-1981).23 Although the primary objective was to
improve coordination during the negotiations, the diplomatic service soon observed
the lack of clear jurisdictions between the ministries.24
15 This structure was preserved until March 1981, when it was replaced by a secretariat of
state dependent on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and managed by Raimundo Bassols,
who  had  been  ambassador  to  the  European  Communities  up  to  then.  The  socialist
government  did  likewise  after  the  general  elections  in  October  1982,  designating
Manuel Marín to the position.25 Ultimately, the Spanish administration needed to learn
from experience about a process such as European integration.26 And it was a great
challenge  to  prepare  a  team  of  experts  to  collaborate  in  negotiations  and  fill  the
consequent positions in Brussels after the final accession.27
 
One reality, different concerns
16 The Community’s concern over the Spanish situation was associated with the broader
context of the Mediterranean transitions, the accession negotiations with Greece, and
the accession applications by Portugal, Spain itself, and even Turkey. An enlargement
of this dimension presented serious consequences for the European economy, so the
negotiations would need to be long and thoughtful to avoid problems. In the case of
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Spain, the rhythm of reforms was made obvious after the designation of Adolfo Suárez,
who expected that the application would be presented in July 1977 at the earliest.28 This
date was not arbitrary: it  coincided with the entry into force of the customs union
between  the  Six  founding  members  and  the  three  new  ones.  This  meant  that  the
Preferential Trade Agreement signed in 1970 had to be renegotiated.29
17 The Spanish delegation disagreed with the priority given by European institutions to
the renegotiation of the agreement. First, the imbalance was mainly against the three
new member states, and second, Spanish diplomats did not understand the need for a
short-term solution when accession with full rights could not be prolonged, in their
opinion,  beyond  1980.  European  predictions  were  less  optimistic  because  of  the
problems  caused  after  the  first  enlargement,  the  debates  about  a  possible  internal
reform, and the context of the economic crisis in the mid-1970s.30 Furthermore, despite
all the advance notice from Brussels, mutual understanding between both parties was
difficult, a significant handicap in subsequent negotiations.
18 The need to reform the EEC had been on the table for years. The heads of government
and  state,  assembled  in  Paris  in  December  1974,  ordered  a  proposal  on  European
integration from Leo Tindemans, the Belgian prime minister.31 It was presented to the
European Parliamentary Assembly in January 1976, practically at the same time that
Areilza started his European tour. The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs knew about
all these debates and tried to avoid meddling. The strategy was always to remain silent
rather  than  expressing  an  opinion  on  the  subject,  at  least  before  enlargement.32
However Raimundo Bassols and some diplomats suggested a compromise in favour of
supranationalism and a stronger Community even though the Spanish position on this
was  purely  symbolic.33 But  the  only  statements  they  obtained  were  those  which
criticised the negative consequences of the pace of negotiations.
19 During the early months, the main task for Madrid was to finalize the opinion on the
Spanish  application  and  open  negotiations  as  soon  as  possible.  Meanwhile,  the
European  agenda  included  enlargement  towards  the  South,  deterioration  of  the
economic situation (with the European Monetary System as the main solution), the first
direct  elections  to  the  European  Parliamentary  Assembly,  debates  on  institutional
reform, and the increasing role of foreign policy.34 While for the candidate country
accession was a national priority, it was just a small part of a larger process for the
European institutions. This situation remained true from the beginning to the end, with
specific exceptions that focused international attention on the Spanish transition.
20 Along with this  problem,  member states  observed with astonishment  the  excessive
optimism of the Spanish government representatives towards negotiations. After the
first meeting, at the level of deputies, European diplomats emphasised their lack of
awareness about the true nature of negotiations. In this sense, they understood that the
forecast  for  accession  was  wrong  because  the  Spanish  team  had  muddled  the
preparation of the opinion and the Fresco on enlargement –within the competency of
the Commission–, with the comprehensive vue d’ensemble –within the competency of
the  Council.35 The  importance  of  this  first  stage  of  negotiations  had  been  totally
underestimated in Madrid although it was a crucial part of the solution of subsequent
problems. In practice this posed a real problem, because it was almost impossible to
make any progress in meetings where negotiations were interpreted very differently by
both sides.
Spanish Accession to the EEC: A Political Objective in an Economic Reality
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 90 | 2015
5
21 Probably,  the  main difference between the candidate  country and the EEC was the
former’s subordination of economic contents to political interests, while the concept of
negotiations was strictly technical for the latter. The candidate country must accept
the acquis communautaire as a starting point and make European law part of its own
national legislation, the adaptation and implementation of this body of common rights
and obligations  being the  basis  of  the  accession negotiations.  However,  the  lack  of
cooperation  by  the  Spanish  government  as  it  tried  to  force  the  timing  without
assuming  a  realistic  position  towards  the  transition  period  was  seen  as  an
insurmountable obstacle. From the other side, particularly after the attempted coup of
23 February 1981, European institutions and member states were accused by Spain of
underestimating the risks,  and Spain called for  new political  determination to  find
common solutions.36
22 Attention  must  also  be  paid  to  the  internal  situation  in  the  Spanish  government.
Despite criticism about European attitudes, the real possibility of getting involved in
political negotiations was limited, given the circumstances surrounding the party in
government. There had been problems since 1980, but as long as the negotiations were
essentially technical this was not an obstacle. But when the vue d’ensemble was almost
concluded and the moment came for political decisions, the ruling UCD (Democratic
Centre Union) was already collapsing due to internal dissent on diverse questions such
as  divorce  law,  regional  policy,  integration in  NATO,  and simply  power  struggles.37
While debates in the EEC about its own internal situation and the future of integration
were detrimental to enlargement, the context of the political transition in Spain was
also  a  handicap.  The  socialist  victory  after  the  general  elections  in  October  1982
instigated a change, both regarding internal coherence and strength and a new climate
of mutual understanding.
 
Toward the enlargement: the convergence of
objectives
23 Spain’s relationship with the EEC was always defined as a purely national issue: it was
an economic necessity for Franco’s regime and a political  aspiration for democrats.
Similarly, other European countries had their own national priorities, as shown by the
cyclical crises that have affected integration due to the egotistical attitude of member
states.38 The  great  difference  is  the  reciprocity  between  national  and  European
interests:  there have always been moments when the national  concerns of  member
states have depended on the development of the integration project. But it was not
until 1982-1983 that the Spanish negotiation team changed its mind about the internal
debates on the reform of the EEC and understood the necessity of conceiving the need
for  reciprocity.  Accession  with  full  rights  was  still  the  main  objective,  but  the
promotion of a stronger EEC was now also a public concern for the candidate country.
24 The  new  administration  after  the  general  elections  of  1982  tried  to  identify  every
country’s position toward Spanish accession. Member states had different interests and
doubts, so the new Spanish team considered it crucial to find a balance between them
all  in order to successfully finish the negotiations.  In doing so,  diplomacy made an
attempt to reinforce bilateral  relations,  mend fences and come to an agreement.  If
Germany approved a new system for its own resources, British complaints about the
Preferential Trade Agreement were handled, relations with France were ameliorated,
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and Italy’s role was publicly recognised, the negotiations would not take a lot of time.39
However, the difficulties persisted. 
25 The  European  Council  of  Stuttgart,  held  17-19 June  1983  at  the  end  of  Germany’s
presidency, launched a huge program for the future of European integration. Results in
the short term were limited, and even the solemn declaration on the European Union
signed by the ten heads of state and government was criticised as too weak by some,
and overambitious by others.40 With regard to enlargement, a bond between budgetary
reform and the signing of the new treaty of accession was formalised, mainly relating
to the increase in resources.41 The Spanish team perceived all these results as a first
step towards raising the blockade on negotiations. However, the second semester of the
year  was  defined  as  a  real  failure  by  almost  everybody.  There  were  scarcely  any
meetings,  and  the  Greek  presidency closed  without  agreement.  Not  even  a  final
declaration was adopted.42
26 Despite this fiasco, and while the member states had found it impossible to come to an
agreement,  the  European Parliament  put  the  finishing  touches  to  its  second direct
elections and presented its own reform project, the Spinelli draft Treaty for a European
Union.43 According  to  article 42,  the  draft  could  enter  into  force  if  the  majority  of
member states and two-thirds of the population of the EEC approved it. With its wide
scope,  it  encouraged major diplomatic  action among the member states  to end the
blockade of decision-making in the Council.44 Indeed, the next Council, held in Brussels
three  months  later,  showed  specific  results  on  economic  and  commercial  policy,
Common Agricultural Policy,  Structural and Cohesion Funds, financial programming
and European budget, and even enlargement. The heads of state and government set a
deadline for concluding the accession negotiations, 30 September 1984, and linked their
success with the increase of the VAT ceiling to 1.4 per cent, the first step towards an
achievable reform.45
27 Alongside this renewed political interest in enlargement there was a change in Spanish
attitude: the deadline was not imperative, because what was most important was for
everyone to come to a good agreement.46 This was interpreted by the EEC as a self-
defence strategy for domestic debates, chiefly the criticisms expressed by the Spanish
Confederation  of  Employers’  Organizations  toward  the  economic  consequences  of
enlargement  in  certain  markets  –especially  in  the  industrial  sector.47 From  the
beginnings, it was questionable whether a consensus on the economic cost of accession
would  be  reached.  When  negotiations  were  almost  concluded  and  the  political
transition seemed to be consolidated, disagreement appeared not in opposition to the
political objective of accession. Nevertheless, negotiations continued and the French
presidency finished in the European Council held in Fontainebleau, where the points
agreed to in Brussels were confirmed and completed.48 
28 It  was impossible to finalize negotiations for the enlargement in September,  as  the
heads of state and government gathered in Brussels had required six months earlier to
the negotiations team. In the opinion of Foreign Minister Fernando Morán, the Irish
government, which was to preside during the second semester of the year, was not
prepared for the assignment. Furthermore, competition between the two countries in
the fishing sector would be a hindrance.49 On the other hand, journalists and some
specialists were of the opinion that member states were delaying things until the end of
the year, when the Socialist Party (PSOE) would be making a decision about Spain’s
membership in NATO.50 Either way, the Spanish government from the start tried to
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concentrate on the strategy of  bilateral  relations.  Various ministers  met with their
European counterparts to discuss specific pending problems, while representatives of
member states at the ministerial level met in the Council of Ministers to negotiate a
final agreement.  At the same time, Helmut Kohl,  François Mitterrand and Margaret
Thatcher  also  urged  the  European  Council  to  definitively  finalize  the  enlargement
negotiations.51
29 However, none of these measures were conclusive. It was the prospect of change in
Eastern Europe and the USSR that mobilised the heads of  state and government to
make  a decision  without  further  delay.  The  death  of  Soviet  leader  Konstantin
Chernenko in March 1985 and the appointment of his successor, Mikhail Gorbachev,
the  youngest  member  of  the  Politburo  and  considered  a  liberal  –or  at  least  a
transformational leader–, was taken by European leaders as the opportunity for Europe
to increase its international power. On the occasion of the state funeral in Moscow,
Kohl, Thatcher, Mitterrand, Bettino Craxi and Felipe González held a meeting in the
German embassy to unblock all the pending negotiations.52 Over the following weeks,
there  were  several  phone  calls  and  face-to-face  meetings  at  diverse  levels  and  in
different capitals,  until  the enlargement was resolved the night between 28 and 29
March.53 Just a few hours later, the European Council congratulated everybody involved
in the negotiations and moved towards institutional reform, which would result in the
first  intergovernmental  conference  of  the  EEC  in  the  following  months  and  the
signature of the Single European Act in February 1986, two months after the entry into
force of the enlargement.54
 
Conclusions
30 None of the contemporary predictions made on Spain’s application to the European
Communities were similar to the actual events required to formalize enlargement. The
Spanish authorities were ambitious, even including the possibility of Spain becoming a
full member state in a matter of three years. Despite the skills of the Spanish team
members  responsible  for  the  negotiations,  their  knowledge  of  both  functional  and
institutional Community structures was indirect. Though Spanish authorities counted
on previous experiences in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, and even in
Greece and Portugal,  the starting point of  each one and the situation in which the
negotiations  took  place  made  each  case  unique.  Neither  could  negotiations  for  the
Preferential Trade Agreement signed in 1970 serve as a model, because the working
method was different, the Community institution responsible was different, and so too
was the ultimate goal.
31 This  forced  negotiators  to  learn  about  the  organization,  procedure,  networks  of
influence  and  internal  functioning  of  the  European  Community,  building  on  the
framework established in negotiating conferences, formal and informal meetings, and
sometimes  with  national  delegations  in  bilateral  summits  outside  the  Community
framework.  It  could  be  said  that  this  was  the  main  influence  that  the  EEC,  as  a
supranational institution, had on the Spanish transition. On a national level, member
states could have been persuaded one way or another. However, the impact from the
European institutions was seen most in legislation adapted to future membership to the
Community  and  the  implementation  of  a  new  administration.  Finally,  while  most
accepted chronologies consider the transition to have been consolidated in 1982, it was
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precisely  after  then  that  the  negotiations  entered  a  more  political  stage  and  the
possibility of action was most likely. 
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ABSTRACTS
Historians have usually seen the European Community as a natural place for Spain to be and not
as a party with its own interests and rules, different from those of the governments in Madrid. In
this article we will refocus the analysis of Spain’s integration to link it to the broader history of
EU enlargement, which in turn was highly influenced by the internal situation of each member
state. If the social, economic and political changes in Spain after Franco’s death conditioned the
approach, objectives and strategies of its European partners, so too did the delicate international
economic scenario of the 1970s, the dialectics of the Cold War and the electoral calendars in
several countries. All that in addition to the permanent clash of interests between supranational
institutions and the European Council.
Les historiens ont souvent considéré la Communauté européenne comme l’horizon naturel de
l’Espagne et non en tant que partie extérieure ayant ses propres intérêts et ses propres règles,
différentes de celles des gouvernements à Madrid. Cet article se propose de recentrer l’analyse de
l’intégration  espagnole  en  la  reliant  à  l’histoire  plus  large  de  l’élargissement  de  l’Union
européenne, elle-même fortement influencée par la situation interne de chaque État membre. Si
les changements sociaux, économiques et politiques dans l’Espagne postfranquiste conditionnent
les approches, les objectifs et les stratégies de ses partenaires européens, il en va de même pour
le délicat scénario économique international des années 1970, les dialectiques de la Guerre froide
ou  les  calendriers  électoraux  dans  plusieurs  pays.  Tout  ceci  sans  oublier  le  conflit  d’intérêt
permanent entre les institutions supranationales et le Conseil européen.
INDEX
Keywords: Spanish transition, foreign policy, European Community, accession negotiations,
European Reform Treaty, international relations
Mots-clés: transition européenne, politique étrangère, Communauté européenne, négociations
pour l’adhésion, relations internationales
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